

REIMAGINING REINTEGRATION

AN ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABLE RETURNS AFTER CONFLICT



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KEY FINDINGS

This report presents an overview of reintegration of returnees across the top 14 districts with the largest number of returnees; altogether, they represent more than 80% of the almost 5 million returnees that IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated in March 2022¹. This research was designed to obtain a **statistically representative sample of the returnee population in each district** with at most a 10% margin of error within a 95% confidence interval.

The key findings below cover all 14 districts of this study. Importantly, specific communities seem farther away from facilitating a durable reintegration than others; in particular, **Hawija, Sinjar, and Shirqat** frequently appear significantly worse than the average across all districts.

Safety and security. There is a moderately positive situation as returnees tend to feel safe, effectively protected in their community, and well accepted as part of the community²; freedom of movement is also widely guaranteed with some exceptions.³ However, it seems that the root causes of conflict have not been durably addressed. Many communities are heavily polarized, and households fear their communities may relapse into violence. The key drivers of social divisions vary by geographical area.

Standard of living. There is nearly full access to adequate housing and to the public services needed for households' well-being, such as essential utilities, education, and healthcare. Water and electricity supply has also been largely restored, or even improved since 2012, in districts of return. However, **wide gaps remain**

for the capacity of public services to fully and sustainably meet people's needs and expectations.

Livelihoods and economic security. Pockets of discrimination remain for some returnees when accessing the labour market; however, employment levels are largely restored to pre-conflict levels. While this is positive, domestic finances remain weak, and there is an extended sense of economic insecurity. **One in three returnee households** reported either not having enough money for food, or having enough money for food but not for other essential items.

Housing, land, and property. By and large, returnees have been able to recover their pre-conflict housing. When eligible for housing compensation, they have been able to apply for it; however, issues remain in terms of delays and inefficiency in the compensation mechanism. Other vulnerabilities remain in terms of land protection in the long-term, with **one in three returnee households** living with informal and irregular housing and tenure.

Personal documentation. Issues with personal documentation are mostly restricted to specific profiles of families, frequently with close relatives (allegedly) associated with ISIS, and these require continued and specialized interventions and advocacy.

Family reunification. There is no prevalence of cases where returnee households are forcibly separated with some members blocked from returning—this indicator, however, may underreport cases of close relatives that are missing or disappeared.

1 DTM Iraq, Round 125 (March 2022).

2 In Shirqat and Hawija districts, feelings of discrimination and being uncomfortable accessing formal law enforcement were pervasive. These two districts were two of the last to be retaken from ISIL control.

3 Regarding movement restrictions, the indicator only considers pervasive and extraordinary measures like the need to obtain an ad hoc security clearance from relevant authorities, time restrictions on when leaving and returning can take place, or the need to provide specific reasons for movement (e.g., for employment, medical treatment, or school attendance). Checkpoint controls or road blockages are not included given that they are ordinary measures existing across the country.

Participation in public affairs. Returnees generally feel able to participate in social and civic activities without discrimination. Respondents reported being able to register to vote should they choose to. However, *one in three households* felt that they are not able to express critical views without retributive violence against them. Moreover, most feel that participation is not meaningful because it does not bring change.

Legal remedies and justice. This area is where the gaps are significant, and much work remains to be done. A large majority of returnees report a failure to see their grievances and violations addressed. They also report inadequate implementation of justice and the rule of law more broadly. Some of these conditions are also reportedly considerably worse now than before the conflict.

THE STUDY'S RATIONAL AND DESIGN

As of March 2022, Iraq has witnessed the return of 4.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their places of origin in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) conflict. While the movement home is the first step toward reintegration, it is not necessarily an indication of its longer-term sustainability. This report updates and

evaluates the extent to which returnees have (re)gained their rights upon return. This includes understanding the level to which returnees perceive the underlying sources of conflict, grievance, and initial displacement—as well as their consequences— are being addressed.

INTRODUCTION

There is a significant number of returnees in Iraq five years after the official conclusion of the ISIL conflict. Around 80% of the more than 6 million individuals that were forcibly displaced since 2014 have already been able to return, with some returns starting as early as 2015.⁴

This is a positive trend, especially compared to other protracted displacement contexts. However, concerns remain about how durable these returns are and whether families have been able to regain their rights fully. The aim of this report is to use new and available evidence to shed light on the reintegration process of these people.

The analysis here relies on new and original representative quantitative data generated by IOM Iraq and Social Inquiry on the returnee population. This data builds upon a previous assessment of durable solutions and obstacles to reintegration.⁵ The analysis includes indicators from a variety of secondary datasets, but also revealed that gaps remained in relevant areas of the

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions.⁶ The new data collected for this study aimed to be more comprehensive by connecting durable solutions with the humanitarian-development peace nexus in the resolution of current displacement and the prevention of future conflict and displacement.

In addition to addressing the gaps of previous data, this report contributes to further operationalizing individual and structural support for people's return and reintegration in Iraq. This contribution provides evidence around the deeper question of 'when does displacement end,' particularly for people returning after periods of conflict, such as Iraq. At the same time, to understand the process of returnees' integration, it can be difficult to find a comparison group of non-displaced people against whom to compare, as often they do not readily; nonetheless, the need to understand how conducive conditions are for sustainable reintegration is critical.

FRAMEWORK: RETURNEE REINTEGRATION

The durable solutions framework helps assess returnees' advancement towards solving reintegration in the relocated area.⁷ It states that displacement does not end until durable solutions are achieved. Reaching a durable solution means that people no longer have *specific needs* that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their rights without discrimination *on account* of their displacement. Durable solutions can be achieved

upon return if several criteria are met – including for the progress returnees make, and the provisions authorities put in place - which represent key return-related obstacles.^{8 9}

However, securing durable solutions remains challenging, particularly when addressing underlying causes of and remedies for forced migration in a humanitarian-development-peace nexus context like Iraq.¹⁰

4 DTM Iraq, Round 125 (March 2022).

5 See, for example, IOM and Social Inquiry, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Integration in Iraq (Baghdad: IOM, 2021). https://iraqdtm.iom.int/files/DurableSolutions/202216553131_iom_Iraq_Home_Again_Categorising_Obstacles_to_Returnee_Reintegration_in_Iraq.pdf

6 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010).

7 Ibid.

8 Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics, "International Recommendations on IDP Statistics," background document to fifty-first session of the UN Statistical Commission, 3-6 March 2020. <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/51st-session/documents/BG-item-3n-international-recommendations-on-IDP-statistics-E.pdf>

9 UNOCHA, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998.

10 Gloria Nguya and Nadia Siddiqui, "Triple Nexus Implementation and Implications for Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement: On Paper and in Practice," Refugee Survey Quarterly 39 (2020): 466-80.

The resolution of displacement is a human rights challenge. Durable solutions imply securing the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), including their rights to security, property, housing, education, health, reparation, justice, truth, and closure for past injustices.¹¹ As part of their efforts to restore and secure these rights, IDPs may have continuing humanitarian needs (e.g., shelter and health services). The places where they seek durable solutions may face structural development and peacebuilding challenges.¹²

Previous attempts to examine the situation of returns in Iraq through a durable solutions lens, although incomplete due to data gaps at the time, showed that the main obstacles to reintegration were related to more structural and social concerns.¹³ Households reportedly had been able to rebuild and restart their lives, meet basic standards of living, and have their fundamental rights respected. The obstacles that remained were beyond individuals' control and required institutional interventions to address. Thus, reintegration in the Iraq could be interpreted as a relatively superficial and fragile. While returnees do not report substantial discrimination or harm, the social and structural concerns which underlaid returnees' displacement in the first place remain unaddressed.

Interventions that aim to build durable solutions and avoid new cycles of forced migration should shift from responding to crises to preventing them.¹⁴ Solutions should promote IDPs' right to return as a socio-political – not only geographical – process. IDPs express complex, often intertwined claims, including for redress and recognition as equal members of the political community in which they live.¹⁵ Therefore, the end of displacement becomes fully realized when returnees are not at risk of displacing again and the impacts and drivers of displacement disappear.

This report aims to examine reintegration through the durable solutions framework. This study measures the ability of people to return without facing discrimination, and the capacity of the people and the state to make that return sustainable without further cycles of fragility, conflict, or displacement. In more practical terms, this report analyses the reintegration data through the following building blocks for analysis:

- **Durable solutions are assessed using rights criteria:** the right to safety and security, adequate standard of living, access to livelihoods, restitutions and protection of housing land and property (HLP), documentation, family reunification, participation in public affairs, and legal remedies and justice.
- The indicators applicable to each of the eight criteria are interpreted based on two interlinked dimensions. The first dimension refers to **situational indicators** evaluate people's experience attaining a number of rights upon return. This dimension includes discrimination and lack of access to services, and conditions to meet immediate needs or recognize people's fundamental rights. The second dimension refers to **structural indicators** that seek to understand the longer-term perceptions and expectations of returnees, such as how well their rights to safety, well-being, livelihoods, participation, and justice are fulfilled. This second dimension thus delves more deeply into the functioning of the state and society as a whole. Importantly, when the environment in the area of return does not provide the criteria in the first dimension, it is unlikely to fulfil the second dimension. Figure 1 provides the conceptual merger of the two dimensions and the eight criteria.

11 IASC, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions, 7. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/iasc-framework-durable-solutions-idps?gclid=Cj0KCQiAnNacBhDvARIsABnDa6_iaYDRGEyZzPhvLhAs7X-D93UPGzIKQr2ZZKYLvj1Ufs_Tu5_vcTVkaAvnHEALw_wcB


12 Iraq Durable Solutions and IOM, Iraq Durable Solutions Toolkit Vol. 1 Facilitated Voluntary Returns (Baghdad: IOM, 2021).

13 IOM and Social Inquiry, Home Again?

14 UN-HRC, Joint study of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on the contribution of transitional justice to the prevention of gross violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, particularly to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their recurrence, A/HRC/37/65, 1 March 2018.

15 Megan Bradley, "Durable Solutions and the Right of Return for IDPs: Evolving Interpretations," *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 30 no. 2 (2018): 218-42.

Figure 1. Analytical framework applied to evaluate reintegration



- Given the focus on the situational and structural dimensions, the formulation of indicators for the eight criteria **combines indicator frameworks** widely used in different fields. Situational indicators regarding the attainment of rights mostly mirror frameworks such as the Joint IDP Profiling Service durable solutions indicator library¹⁶, those used in IOM Iraq's longitudinal study of internal displacement¹⁷, and an adaptation of those used to measure the integration of IDPs and refugees into the places to which they displaced.¹⁸ For structural indicators, this study relies on frameworks that deal with conflict and stabilization¹⁹, fragility²⁰, and other topics specifically related to the context of the ISIL conflict in Iraq.²¹ Select operational indicators from Iraq's Durable Solutions Monitoring and Analysis Framework were also adapted to the household level across situational and structural dimensions as it contains both for specific criteria. The following sections for the eight measures present the complete list of indicators used in this report.
- The Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS) guidelines, drawn from the IASC Framework, recommends **comparing the situation of returnees with that of other groups** in their area to assess whether the vulnerabilities they suffer are related to their displacement or not. The optimal comparison group should be people who never displaced from the relocated zone (the equivalent of a host community in IDP contexts). However, the scale of conflict in Iraq meant that, in most districts affected, most people, if not all, were displaced at some point in time. Even when there are non-displaced people in an area, the fact that they endured life under ISIL control for an extended period and experienced the military operations to retake these areas first-hand makes them a poor benchmark. Further, identifying such people through self-reporting is difficult, considering the varying levels of social stigma and the related legal and security risks they may still face.²² These factors highlight that stayees may have their own vulnerabilities related to

16 Joint IDP Profiling Service, Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library (Geneva: JIPS, 2018).

17 IOM and Georgetown University, Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq, see: <https://iraqrecovery.iom.int/durablesolutions>

18 See, for example, IOM and Social Inquiry, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq (Baghdad: IOM, 2020).

19 For an application to Iraq, see, USIP, Sanad for Peacebuilding, and Social Inquiry, Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework, available from: [https://www.usip.org/programs/conflict-and-stabilization-monitoring-framework, which was adapted from the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments \(MPICE\) set of indicators](https://www.usip.org/programs/conflict-and-stabilization-monitoring-framework, which was adapted from the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) set of indicators).

20 See, OECD Development Centre, Perspectives on Global Development: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World, Paris: OECD, 2011); and World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011).

21 See, for example, IOM and Optimum Analysis, Community Perceptions Survey on the Return and Reintegration of Persons with Perceived Affiliation in Iraq (Baghdad: IOM, 2021).

22 Because these individuals stayed under ISIL control and its aftermath, they may be perceived to be associated with or supporters of the group in some contexts by both security actors and those returning alike. This has led to extrajudicial and revenge killings in the immediate aftermath of conflict and continues to have security and legal implications for these individuals under Federal Anti-Terrorism Laws to present, see, Melisande Genat, Tribal Justice Mechanisms and Durable Solutions for Families with a Perceived Affiliation to ISIS (Baghdad: IOM, 2020); and UNAMI, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice in Iraq: Trials under the Anti-Terrorism Laws and Implications for Justice, Accountability and Social Cohesion in the Aftermath of ISIL (Baghdad: UNAMI, 2020).

having *not* displaced at all; it's plausible that currently some may even experience worse conditions than returnees. To understand the changes over time for these different groups, this report uses **pre-conflict data** as a benchmark.²³ This data covers the same districts assessed, and was obtained from national datasets that were collected 2012, two years prior to the official start of the ISIL conflict. In determining how near or far a given return area and its population is to their pre-conflict state—and whether those states were fragile to begin with or not—will help in further illuminating how to best address not only return-specific dynamics, but longstanding ones as well.

RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND APPLICATION

The study covers the top 14 districts with the largest number of returnees. Altogether, they represent more than 80% of the almost 5 million returnees that IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimated in March 2022.²⁴ This research was designed to obtain a **statistically representative sample of the returnee population in each district** with at most a 10% margin of error within a 95% confidence interval. Sampling was stratified at district level. Data collection targeted all residents in these districts, including returnees and stayees. Districts with an expected sizable population of non-displaced were oversampled to still obtain a representative number of returnees—this was the case for eight districts, namely Mosul, Telafar, Heet, Hawija, Shirqat, Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Balad, given that they either had a large proportion of population that did not displace during the occupation by ISIL or were not affected directly by conflict and military operations.

Data collection took place between March and April

2022, conducted by a combination of Social Inquiry's and IOM's field teams. The total sample size achieved is 2,803 respondents, of which 2,260 are returnees and 543 are non-displaced individuals. Table 1 details this sample by district. The proportion of non-displaced in several districts (e.g., Hawija, Shirqat, Heet, and Telafar), where it is qualitatively known that people remained for the duration of the conflict, is considerably low. As mentioned before, an explanation for the lower number of non-displaced households surveyed in these districts may be linked to the unwillingness to self-report that they remained under ISIL during the conflict timeline as it is frequently associated with varying levels of social stigma and the related legal and security risks they may be subject to.

Table 1. District-level sample size by respondent type

District	Returnees	IDPs	Non-displaced	Total
Mosul	151	0	90	241
Ramadi	149	0	1	150
Falluja	148	0	2	150
Telafar	232	0	5	237
Tikrit	149	0	1	150
Heet	222	0	18	240
Hawija	226	8	7	241
Hamdaniya	151	0	0	151
Shirqat	211	0	25	236
Kirkuk	49	1	192	241
Baiji	150	0	0	150
Sinjar	150	0	0	150
Khanaqin	192	2	46	240
Balad	80	2	156	238
Total	2,260	13	543	2,816

²³ Analysis using 2012 data was conducted only for indicators that are comparable with indicators used in this study.

²⁴ DTM Iraq, Round 125 (March 2022).

Analysing how returnees in different areas of return compare to one another is useful in understanding which situational and structural factors are specific to some locations and those which are pervasive across them. As such, for the analysis in this report, only returnee data is used. Except for Kirkuk and Balad, the sample size for each district ranges from 148 surveys in Falluja to 232 in Telafar.²⁵ To account for the differing sample sizes and the actual returnee population as well as to balance male and female respondents,²⁶ weights are applied when aggregating the data for the 14 districts.²⁷

To conduct the analysis presented in this report, a series of indicators at individual or household level are generated from the data that fit the criteria framework

described above. In total, 46 indicators are analysed here. Where possible, these indicators are also matched with data available from 2012, obtained from the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey and the Iraq Knowledge Network Survey.²⁸ The 2012 dataset was not geared toward durable solutions and an internal displacement context, as such it contains 13 indicators that overlap with the framework developed for reintegration. To ensure comparability of results, the survey questionnaire used in this study was designed so that the wording of matching questions was as equivalent as possible to these pre-existing surveys. Given that the results generated in all surveys are representative of the population at district level, comparisons of indicators are feasible.

25 Kirkuk and Balad are districts that were only indirectly affected by the ISIL conflict. There was conflict and displacement in some parts of the districts but, for the most part, they did not fall under ISIL control like the other districts covered in the study. As such, while they have many returning households, they also feature an even larger number of households that did not experience the conflict and never left. The sample for these two districts are thus mostly formed by non-displaced; the total number of returnees interviewed in Kirkuk and Balad is 49 and 80, respectively, falling short of the minimum level of statistical representativeness. Results at district level for these two must be taken as indicative.

26 The overall gender distribution achieved in the data collection is 1,758 male respondents (63%) and 1,045 female respondents (37%), which allows for the application of weights to carry out an unbiased analysis.

27 Initial analysis revealed little to no differences in responses between male and female respondents; differences did emerge across certain indicators when comparing responses between individuals from male- and female-headed households. This more detailed analysis is presented in a separate brief, IOM and Social Inquiry, "A Comparison of Female- and Male-Headed Households in Districts of Return" (Baghdad: IOM, 2022).

28 Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (2012). Database by Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Ministry of Planning, Government of Iraq, Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, Ministry of Planning, Government of Iraq in conjunction with World Bank; and Iraq Knowledge Network Survey (2011). Database by Central Statistical Office, Government of Iraq.

CRITERIA 1: RIGHT TO SAFETY AND SECURITY

The links between safety and reintegration are crosscutting, connecting feelings of safety, security provision, and several key dimensions of social cohesion.

Key takeaway: There is a moderately positive situation as returnees tend to feel safe, effectively protected in their community, and well accepted as part of the community; freedom of movement is also widely guaranteed with some exceptions. However, it seems that the root causes of conflict have not been durably addressed. *Many communities are heavily polarized*, and households fear their communities may relapse into violence. The key drivers of social divisions vary by geographical area.

SAFETY AND SECURITY: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

All districts of return in this analysis have experienced the ISIL conflict and armed violence directly. Although the conflict is over, sources of violence and tension remain in many places and could affect the population as they return. Risks do not come only from exposure to physical violence. Social relations also play a role in ensuring safety and security in the community, especially as the recent conflict exploited pre-existing cleavages within the community based on ethno-religious, tribal, or political grounds. Such divisions may persist, or even worsen, immediately after conflict if people feel unsafe and their grievances remain unaddressed.

The right to safety and security includes multiple and complementary indicators. The first is in returnees' experience of safety at a personal level. Do they feel safe in their place of origin without threats to their physical integrity? Do they feel safe and free to move around? Do they feel secure and able to access law enforcement or justice when needed? Do they feel

safe socially as members of the community once back? These questions encompass the direct exercise of the right to safety upon return.

At the same time, it is also essential to consider whether there are effective mechanisms in place, trusted by the people, to further prevent risks and guarantee safety and the non-repetition of extreme violence in the long term. The right to safety and security implies feeling safe even when there are no immediate threats for returnees. Building sustainable reintegration requires generating confidence that the future is cleared of renewed insecurity down the line. As such, it is important to gauge the effectiveness and capacity of formal security actors in providing protection and preventing conflict, as well as the confidence community members have in these actors to do so. Finally, this criterion includes understanding the levels of horizontal division and polarization within the community itself, which can be potential drivers of future violence.

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO SAFETY AND SECURITY MEASURED?

The indicators used to measure safety and security are listed in the table below. The cover both the immediate physical risks at the personal level and the existence of mechanisms and firewalls to reduce the potential future conflict.

This table also provides comparison to 2012 data

(right before the start of the ISIL conflict and its ensuing displacement), when available. As discussed in the methodology section, this provides a benchmark to better understand reintegration after displacement. Here, this data exists for three of the nine indicators presented.

Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who feel their day-to-day safety is not ensured	5%	20%
% of returnees experiencing movement restrictions by authorities	13%	
% of returnees who feel judged or discriminated by the rest of community	11%	
% of returnees who do not feel comfortable when accessing police or formal law enforcement	17%	

Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who lack confidence in security forces	7%	16%
% of returnees who do not feel protected by the state from external threats	6%	
% of returnees who do not feel trusted or accepted in the community	9%	13%
% of returnees who indicate irreconcilable social divisions among the community	40%	
% of returnees who fear a recurrence of violence in the community	44%	

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

The **overall situation for areas of return seems moderately positive** when it comes to the personal safety experienced by returnees and the positive reestablishment of community links without discrimination or negative judgment. Most returnees, for instance, feel that their day-to-day safety is ensured in

the relocation area. The current situation is also a slight improvement from pre-conflict dynamics in these same districts, where a higher percentage of the population, on average, felt unsafe. Freedom of movement is also widely guaranteed with few exceptions.²⁹

Feelings of discrimination in inter-community relations or when interacting with formal law enforcement actors are relatively minor. However, being discriminated against are pervasive in Shirqat and Hawija districts. These two districts were two of the last to be retaken from ISIL control. While people reported feeling safe,

²⁹ Regarding movement restrictions, the indicator only considers pervasive and extraordinary measures like the need to obtain an ad hoc security clearance from relevant authorities, time restrictions on when leaving and returning can take place, or the need to provide specific reasons for movement (e.g., for employment, medical treatment, or school attendance). Checkpoint controls or road blockages are not included given that they are ordinary measures existing across the country.

their day-to-day life is impacted by distrust (likely related to perceived affiliation or support of some families or tribes for ISIL) and having a poor relationship between the community and the security forces currently in the area.


WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

In terms of long-term fulfilment of the right to safety and security, the views of returnees are also positive to some extent. There are no widespread concerns or lack of confidence about the capacity of the state to respond to security threats. Most respondents stated they feel accepted as community members, with

notable exceptions being people in Sinjar and Hawija. This situation seems to match with the pre-conflict benchmark of 2012.

However, there are some unresolved structural gaps that belie the otherwise positive safety dynamics. For many returnees, it seems that the root causes of conflict have not been durably addressed, considering how significantly they report that their communities are heavily polarized and that they fear their communities may relapse into violence. The key drivers of social divisions vary by geographical area, as they are rooted in local dynamics (see Figure 2). For example, ethno-religious or tribal tensions are significant in Ninewa and Kirkuk governorates. Political differences and inequality in wealth and opportunities feature prominently in Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din.

Figure 3. Disaggregation of drivers of divisions by governorate




Note: Only 1,311 respondents answered the question What is the main driver of divisions in the community in this governorate? 234 respondents in Anbar, 102 in Diyala, 323 in Kirkuk, 233 in Ninewa, and 399 in Salah al-Din. Governorates only reflect districts included in the study.


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 1

The following figures provide the district break-down for the indicators used to measure rights to safety and security.


% of returnees who feel their day-to-day safety is not ensured




% of returnees experiencing movement restrictions by authorities




% of returnees who feel judged or discriminated by the rest of community




% of returnees who do not feel comfortable when accessing police or formal law enforcement




% of returnees who lack confidence in security forces




% of returnees who do not feel protected by the state from external threats




% of returnees who do not feel trusted or accepted in the community



% of returnees who indicate irreconcilable social divisions among the community



% of returnees who fear a recurrence of violence in the community



CRITERIA 2: RIGHT TO ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING

Adequate standards of living are predominantly linked to material well-being. The sub-criteria here covers obstacles to access to essential utilities, and healthcare and education (both in terms of access to facilities and quality or the ability to satisfy people's needs and expectations).

Key takeaway: There is nearly full access to adequate housing and to the public services needed for households' well-being, such as essential utilities, education, and healthcare. Water and electricity supply has also been largely restored, or even improved since 2012, in districts of return. However, *wide gaps remain for the capacity of public services to fully and sustainably meet people's needs and expectations.*

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

Having a proper dwelling and access to water and electricity is frequently the first basic requisite to consider for returns.³⁰ Public services may not be directly available after conflict, when residential areas, facilities, and supply networks are damaged or otherwise impacted. The lack of public services poses an extraordinary challenge for returnees' sustainable reintegration. As such, these elements tend to feature prominently and early in the interventions by authorities and international stakeholders in the aftermath of conflict.³¹ However, barriers to achieving adequate well-being may still be present even when dwellings and supply networks are rehabilitated; this happens when residents are enduring protracted low quality or quantity of service provision.

The contrast between the direct attainment of the right and its sustainable fulfilment is especially fitting

in relation to two indispensable and universal public services in Iraq: health and education. There must exist a provision of healthcare and schooling in areas of return that are relatively easy and safe to get to. At the same time, returnees must not be discriminated against when accessing them. Reconstruction and restoration of facilities, as well as facilitating needed paperwork for families when necessary, play a large role in attaining this right. For To fully realize the right to healthcare and education, the service received must meet public expectations and effectively satisfy residents' needs.

In other words, access and capacity are the two complementary components of the right to an adequate standard of living. This is a key component of a social contract between society and state, especially in middle income countries such as Iraq.

30 IOM, RWG, and Social Inquiry, "The Physical and Social Dimensions of Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas," Return Index Thematic Series Briefing 1 (Baghdad: IOM, 2019).

31 Interventions that focus on remedying house destruction also involve making claims and compensation available, as stipulated for example in the Iraqi regulatory framework. This is included in a dedicated discussion later in the report (see Criteria 4, right to restitution and protection of housing, land, and property).

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING MEASURED?

The following tables present the availability and capacity of service provision for water, electricity, healthcare, and education. The table also indicates the type of housing requisite for directly attaining this right. Some indicators can be compared to their 2012 pre-conflict benchmarks. This highlights their evolution and puts into perspective the restoration efforts undertaken since the end of the conflict.

Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households who live in uninhabitable housing	1%	
% of returnee households without access to public water supply	3%	19%
% of returnee households without access to public electricity supply	0%	1%
% of returnee households without access to health facilities	1%	0%
% of returnee households without access to education facilities	2%	2%
% of returnee households who are discriminated against in accessing health facilities	1%	
% of returnee households who are discriminated against in accessing education facilities	1%	

Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households without sufficient water supply for their needs	30%	45%
% of returnee households without sufficient electricity supply for their needs	78%	93%
% of returnee households who faced issues with receiving healthcare	62%	
% of returnee households who faced issues with receiving schooling	64%	
% of returnees who indicate inadequate capacity of the state to provide healthcare	64%	45%
% of returnees who indicate inadequate capacity of the state to provide education	31%	19%

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Few returnees live in houses with poor physical conditions, such as informal shelters, makeshift dwellings, unfinished or unenclosed buildings, or tents. There are minimal as are cases of returnees residing in homes that remain damaged. This is a positive development especially taking into account the damage caused by the conflict. Indeed, 59% of the returnee households indicated that their houses were damaged, destroyed, or looted. However, respondents managed to repair them

to make them liveable again. This indicator may show only some of the issues regarding the right to adequate housing. The data does not reflect the fact that that displaced households report house destruction as a key barrier preventing their return. As such, uninhabitable housing is still an issue in many of these conflict-affected districts.³²

Water and electricity supply has also been largely restored, or even improved, in districts of return. With very few exceptions, most households and locations connected to the public networks. Currently, supply even reaches areas that were not covered back in 2012, indicative of the investment executed in this sector. Sinjar is a particularly stark example of this positive

32 See, the Durable Solutions Task Force, Area-Based Coordination Groups reporting, available from: <https://iraqdurablesolutions.net/Home/ABC>.

trend. In 2012, nearly 8 out of 10 households there had no public water supply (78%), compared to the approximately 3 out of 10 (31%) who do not have this supply in 2022.

Finally, access to healthcare and education is similarly optimistic. All households reported having access to a health facility or school. These indicators show the extent of the restoration of services in Iraq, resetting the coverage back to pre-conflict levels in terms of close-by and safe availability. In addition, cases of discrimination when accessing these services are also very limited—such cases would include bureaucratic obstacles (e.g., needing wasta or personal connections for access or facing issues with paperwork)³³ and direct exclusion by authorities.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

The perspective seems to change radically when expanding the focus into questioning how well the standard of living is guaranteed beyond physical accessibility. Most returnees have negative views in this regard, as is further detailed below. Before diving deeper, it is essential to note that these are issues relatively widespread across the whole of Iraq.³⁴

Thus these issues are not just a consequence of the ISIL conflict experience but point more to pre-existing instability and neglect.

The data shows that the largest gap between accessibility and capacity is found in electricity supply and healthcare provision. While access is universal, most returnees indicate that the system does not fulfil their needs. Similarly, returnees reported issues with water supply and education provision, but to a much lesser extent. All districts feature this dynamic, indicating that it is not an isolated issue but a structural one.


For healthcare and education, specific issues returnees face when using these services is shown in Figure 3. Besides the affordability of healthcare, the other problems seem linked to the government's capacity to provide the service: lack of treatment or medicine in healthcare and defective materials, spaces, or staff in education.

In short, what the state can provide falls significantly short of people's expectations and this is a persistent, and unresolved grievance. The mismatch between expectations and government provision of public goods matters not only for reintegration but for evaluating residents' confidence in institutions and in their own and future generations' life prospects in the country (detailed in following sections of this report).

33 Bureaucratic barriers apply especially for education when enrolling children in school. Significant barriers remain for households whose children lack documentation, a fact especially relevant for families with perceived ISIL affiliation. Specific protection interventions are rolled out for these cases by specialized humanitarian actors. This is further discussed when analysing criteria 5, right to personal documentation.

34 IOM and Social Inquiry, *A Climate of Fragility: Household Profiling in the South of Iraq – Basra, Thi-Qar and Missan Governorates* (Baghdad: IOM, 2022), available from: <https://iraqrecovery.iom.int/Southern%20Profiles/>

Figure 3. Issues receiving healthcare and schooling disaggregated




DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 2


The following figures provide the district breakdown for the indicators used to measure rights to an adequate standard of living. Hawija is the district with more households reported living in uninhabitable housing

(15%). In Hamdaniya and Sinjar, individuals claimed no access to public water 27% and 31%, respectively. Sinjar is the district where more respondents stated no access to education facilities (21%).


% of returnee households who live in uninhabitable housing




% of returnee households without access to public water supply




% of returnee households without access to public electricity supply




% of returnee households without access to health facilities




% of returnee households without access to education facilities




% of returnee households who are discriminated against in accessing health facilities




% of returnee households who are discriminated against in accessing education facilities




% of returnee households without sufficient water supply for their needs




% of returnee households without sufficient electricity supply for their needs




% of returnee households who faced issues with receiving healthcare




% of returnee households who faced issues with receiving schooling



% of returnees who indicate inadequate capacity of the state to provide healthcare



% of returnees who indicate inadequate capacity of the state to provide education



CRITERIA 3: RIGHT TO ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

The right to livelihoods upon return is affected by immediate concerns, such as being unfairly prevented from generating a livelihood, and by more structural issues linked to economic recovery and the availability of opportunities for all.

Key takeaway: Pockets of discrimination remain for some returnees when accessing the labour market; however, employment levels are largely restored to pre-conflict levels. While this is positive, domestic finances remain weak, and there is an extended sense of economic insecurity. *One in three returnee households* reported either not having enough money for food, or having enough money for food but not for other essential items.

LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC SECURITY: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

Returnees cannot exercise their right to livelihoods when they are prevented or discriminated by others from accessing a job, being readmitted to their previous employment, or recovering their productive assets. Part of this issue links with social cohesion, where individuals seeking jobs may face rejection by employers due to their identity and any perceived links with conflict dynamics. Similarly, authorities may place restrictions on which employees can reincorporate into the public sector on return, especially if they face issues obtaining the necessary security clearances. Finally, returnees that used to engage in agriculture, livestock, and trade or services before displacement may also face restrictions when seeking to restart these livelihoods. This is sometimes linked to the presence of certain actors in areas of return seeking financial gain through ad-hoc taxes, bribes, or right-out confiscation of goods or equipment.³⁵

Even when such discrimination does not exist, and people can access employment, many households still fail to secure their livelihoods or reach a more stable economic situation. Reintegration often occurs in fragile or disrupted economies, with high unemployment affecting all population groups. In such circumstances, fulfilling the right to livelihoods is challenging as jobs may not be available, and households may remain in vulnerable or precarious financial situations. Actions to redress such structural shortcomings are indispensable in areas of return.³⁶ An indication that returnees are reaching economic security and stability, and that these structural issues are being addressed, comes from their views on whether it is possible for their children to live in better conditions when they grow up.

35 Roger Guiu and Sogand Afkari, "Post-Conflict Political Economy in Sinjar, Iraq: What the Aftermath of Conflict and Historical Neglect Mean for Recovering the Local Economy," Policy Brief (Erbil: Social Inquiry, 2019).

36 Jordan Lesser-Roy, "If I Leave . . . I Cannot Breathe": Climate Change and Civilian Protection in Iraq (Erbil: CIVIC, 2022).

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC SECURITY MEASURED?

Frist, the indicators below cover the different situations in which returnees may be discriminated against in accessing livelihoods in their places of origin. These are then followed by indicators aiming to gauge the extent to which returnee households live within fragile economic conditions and with poor prospects.

The only indicator here that has a benchmark with 2012 is the unemployment rate. For both the current study and the 2012 data, this rate is calculated not from the general survey but from a specific roster module of all individuals older than 16 years old within the respondents' household, thus making it more accurate.³⁷

Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households with a member discriminated against in accessing the labor market or employment	10%	
% of returnee households with a member prevented from reincorporating to public sector positions	1%	
% of returnee households with a member prevented from recovering productive assets or businesses	1%	
Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of unemployment in the districts of return	14%	15%
% of returnee households with unstable income sources	19%	
% of returnee households at the lowest levels of purchasing capacity	33%	
% of returnees who feel that next generations will not be able to live better	66%	

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Returnees seem to be able to enjoy access to the labour market or seek to establish livelihoods freely without discrimination. When the latter does occur, it is frequently reported as a social cohesion issue, where returnees seeking employment face discrimination from employers (who in most cases are also formerly displaced people). In other cases, although it is not included in the

construction of this indicator, prospective employees reported needing to use *wasta* or personal connections to find employment.

Other types of discrimination recorded in this study are minimal. Only a few instances of households indicating that a family member that was a public employee before the conflict is not allowed to reincorporate.³⁸ Within the sample, 35% of households had a member working in the public sector (including security forces) in 2014 before the conflict. About 28% of respondents work in the same position at present.

37 The unemployment rate is calculated by dividing the number of working-age individuals that are unemployed and actively looking for work by the total workforce (i.e., the economically active working age population that includes those employed and those unemployed). The economically inactive population, which includes students, housewives, retired people, those who cannot work, and those unwilling to work, is thus not included in this calculation.

38 These situations frequently occur when the former public employee is found or suspected to have some association with ISIL when the group was in control of the area and thus fail to obtain a security clearance. As such, cases related to this situation may be underreported in the survey as it is sensitive information that respondents may not wish to disclose. To note, public employment is the most widespread occupation among the population.


The disparity in the figures pre- and post-conflict relates mainly to reported retirement (6%) followed distantly by not being allowed to reincorporate into their previous posts (1%). Similarly, few households indicate that they cannot recover their last economic activity (i.e., agriculture, livestock, trade, or other services) due to restrictions imposed on them or confiscating of goods and equipment by authorities or other actors in the area.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Rather than discrimination, the biggest obstacle affecting all households is the lack of livelihood opportunities available in their places of origin. The most objective indicator to gauge the general economic situation in a location is the unemployment rate, which offers a sense of the recovery achieved after conflict. The unemployment rate shows that the current situation in the districts of return resembles pre-conflict levels. Unemployment in the assessed districts stands at 14% which is similar to the average rate for the same districts in 2012. Unemployment fluctuates from 8% in Falluja to 39% in Shirqat. However, Shirqat is an outlier and almost no other district surpasses a 20% unemployment rate. While these results seem relatively high, it falls close to the Iraq average of 13%, and the Middle East region average estimated at 11%, both based on data from 2017.³⁹

Economic security is mainly determined by the income sources that households can tap into and by the level of expenditure they can afford. The picture here is slightly more negative. Few respondents, but not insignificant proportion, rely only on what could be considered unstable income sources to get by, including daily labour, informal commerce, family support, charity, or savings (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Disaggregation of sources of household revenue



Note: Multiple choice responses permitted. Unstable income sources in red.

An even larger percentage of families reported struggling financially to make ends meet. Self-reported affordability is a proxy commonly used to categorize relative household wealth and poverty. Table 2 shows the categories in this regard in which returnee households fall in districts of return. One-third of the sample ranges from not having enough money for food to having enough money for food but not enough for other basic items.

39 World Bank Database, see: <https://data.worldbank.org/>. Iraq's 2022 unemployment rate is also estimated at 13%, based on figures from the International Labour Organization's ILOSTAT Database, see: <https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/#>

Table 2. Disaggregation of self-reported levels of household affordability and purchasing power across districts of return

Self-reported affordability		Percentage of households
Lowest	We do not have enough money even for food	6%
	We have enough money for food, but not enough to buy clothes and shoes as needed	27%
	We have enough money for food and clothing, but not enough to buy expensive items if we had to	45%
	We can buy some expensive items, but we cannot buy everything we want	19%
Highest	We can buy whatever we want	4%


Finally, while overall indicators for livelihoods and economic security may not be considered critically harmful, there is a generalized lack of confidence in prospects for the future. Most returnees do not expect that living conditions and opportunities will improve for

coming generations. Although this indicator is more subjective, holding these views may shape household decisions about which locations could offer a better future for their children and whether moving elsewhere is seriously considered.


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 3

The following figures provide the district breakdown for the indicators used to measure rights related to access to livelihoods and economic security.


% of returnee households with a member discriminated against in accessing the labour market or employment




% of returnee households with a member prevented from reincorporating to public sector positions




% of returnee households with a member prevented from recovering productive assets or businesses




% of unemployment in the districts of return




% of returnee households with unstable income sources



% of returnee households at the lowest levels of purchasing capacity



% of returnees who feel that future generations will not be able to live more comfortably



CRITERIA 4: RIGHT TO RESTITUTION AND PROTECTION OF HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY

This set of indicators looks at other obstacles beyond the physical destruction of residences that can prevent returnees from settling back into their homes. Rights to property restitution and compensation are closely linked to housing, land, and property issues (HLP), which are connected to accountability and redress processes.

Key takeaway: By and large, returnees have been able to recover their pre-conflict housing. When eligible for housing compensation, they have been able to apply for it; however, issues remain in terms of delays and inefficiency in the compensation mechanism. Other vulnerabilities remain in terms of land protection in the long-term, with *one in three returnee households* living with informal and irregular housing and tenure.

RESTITUTION AND PROTECTION OF HLP: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

The links between reintegration and HLP rights not only include the legal right of returnees to access their original homes but also on access to compensation in case of HLP losses due to conflict. HLP issues tend to be at the centre of post-conflict dynamics due to the destruction of residential areas and community disputes usually related to house occupations.

In countries in this situation, like Iraq, there are frequently regulatory frameworks put forward to deal with the protection of HLP that involve filing claims with relevant authorities. Iraq's Law 20, adopted in 2009 and amended in 2015, applies retroactively from March 2003 through to the present. It covers harm caused by ISIL or during the military operations against it. The law seeks to compensate citizens for deaths, injuries, and property damage, among others.⁴⁰

There is a structural perspective when it comes to HLP protection. The long-term exercise of the right to security of tenure is sometimes vulnerable to issues linked to the formality of the home and land ownership. Many returnees may remain in an insecure situation in this regard, in most cases subjected to irregular ownership since before displacement. HLP informality appears especially in urban areas—including as a result of former or remaining IDPs opting to relocate to these areas—where the institutional framework has not been able to respond accordingly. This leaves families more exposed to sub-standard housing, to ownership disputes, and to mass eviction by authorities. It also tends to leave these households without formal documentation unable to apply for the compensation even if they are eligible.

⁴⁰ Caroline Baudot, "We Hope, But We Are Hopeless:" Civilians' Perceptions of The Compensation Process in Iraq (Erbil: CIVIC, 2018); and Khaled Zaza et al., *Mosul After the Battle: Reparations for Civilian Harm and the Future of Ninewa* (London: Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights / Minority Rights Group International, 2020).

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO THE RESTITUTION AND PROTECTION OF HLP MEASURED?

Issues around property rights are mainly evaluated through three situations: cases of house occupation and usurpation, the ability to file claims for compensation in case of damage or destruction, and the informality of housing or land ownership. For these three indicators, there is no 2012 benchmark available.

It is important to note that the indicator related to HLP

compensation is strictly linked to whether reportedly eligible households can file a claim or are otherwise unable to exercise this right due to discrimination. More information is provided below regarding the context to this process, including the fact that many households have indeed been able to file a claim, but their situation is far from resolved due to delays in receiving a response.

Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households not currently living in their pre-conflict housing who are unable to recover/access it due to occupation, confiscation, or being prevented from doing so	< 1%	
% of returnee households prevented from accessing property compensation	2%	


Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households living in informal housing or land	35%	

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Eight in ten households are living in the same housing as they were prior to the conflict. Other respondents changed their residence because their previous home remains damaged or destroyed, or because they were renting before the war started. A very small proportion of households who changed living places cannot recover their pre-conflict housing because it was being occupied by others without permission, because it was confiscated by authorities, or because they are prevented from accessing it.

Given the extensive level of house damage and destruction from conflict, property compensation is a key feature in return areas — even though most households have been able to repair or restore their damaged or destroyed homes to live in them again (see Criteria 2 above). Based on self-reported levels of house destruction or damage returnees have experienced, around 70% of households would seem potentially eligible for compensation. Overall, those who wished to have been effectively able to file a claim, with only 2% of households report being prevented from accessing this legal mechanism. Others have chosen not to apply for the moment for various reasons presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Compensation for property in the districts of return



affected people have for Iraqi institutions.⁴² Thus, falling into this situation could also be interpreted as a right not yet attained.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

House and land informality are relatively common in many districts of return. Table 3 details the different types of houses and land ownership reported by respondents. The first row depicts the most formal and secure tenure, where the households own a plot of land for residential purposes and have the necessary registration. However, this situation is only widespread in large urban areas such as Tikrit and Mosul. For the rest of the districts, the most common trend is households expanding onto agricultural land or settling on public land without official permission.

What is the reason you do not plan to seek compensation?	
It is not worth it	8%
We do not trust the system	7%
We do not want to go through the process	5%
It is an expensive process	4%
We are prevented from seeking compensation	2%
We miss the documentation needed	1%
Other	2%

Table 3. Disaggregation of house ownership status returned areas

Most Formal Option	Ownership Status	Percentage
	Private residential land (purchased and registered)	61%
	Private residential land (not purchased)	3%
	Public housing	1%
	Agricultural land (purchased or gifted)	17%
	Agricultural land (not purchased)	6%
	Public land (given to us officially by the government)	1%
	Public land (purchased or gifted)	3%
	Public land (built on it without official permission)	5%
	Rented agricultural public land	2%
	[Unknown]	1%

Slightly more than one-third of returnee households that applied for compensation indicate that their claim remains unresolved. In many cases, this situation may have dragged on for years, and there is no guarantee that they will receive compensation in a timely manner. Institutional backlogs in processing these claims have delayed the compensation payments in some cases for years.⁴¹ Past and current processes for compensation were also affected by delays and heavy bureaucratic procedures that negatively impacted the confidence of


41 Ina Rehema Jahn et al., Housing, Land and Property Issues Facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq (Baghdad: IOM, 2016); Baudot, “We Hope, But We Are Hopeless;” and Khaled Zaza et al., Mosul After the Battle.

42 Deborah Isser and Peter Van der Auwerart, Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return for Iraq’s Displaced, Special Report 221 (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2009); Baudot, “We Hope, But We Are Hopeless;” and Khaled Zaza et al., Mosul After the Battle.


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 4

The following figures provide the district break-down for the indicators used to measure rights to restitution and protection of housing, land and property.


% of returnee households not currently living in their pre-conflict housing who are unable to recover/access it due to occupation, confiscation, or being prevented from doing so



% of returnee households prevented from accessing property compensation



% of returnee households living in informal housing or land



CRITERIA 5: RIGHT TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

Obstacles to reintegration also consist of issues linked to personal documentation for family members.

Key takeaway: Issues with personal documentation are mostly restricted to specific profiles of families, frequently with close relatives (allegedly) associated with ISIS. While this is a small proportion of the returnee caseload, these people require continued and specialized interventions and advocacy.

PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

Possessing personal documentation plays a crucial role in the process of returns. Civil documents are essential in obtaining security clearance for households and individuals willing to return, hence impacting individuals' freedom of movement, in addition to having implications on their ability to access government services, justice, or seek jobs or assistance. Throughout displacement, families may face issues with documentation due to loss and lack of recognition, among other issues.

When returning without essential personal documentation, families could be exposed to security and protection risks.⁴³ Any bureaucratic procedure includes security checks on relatives, especially for households with close relatives perceived of being affiliated with ISIL. These households also, frequently experience stigma and discrimination.⁴⁴ Many women face issues in obtaining death or divorce certificates from deceased or missing husbands with links to ISIL; they also face issues obtaining children's birth certificates.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Results show that around 2% of the households have a member still missing some personal documentation. There is little difference in this rate for female-headed

households, or amongst households that returned at different times since the conflict. Some of the frequent issues reported by households who are seeking to replace missing documentation do not directly refer necessarily to any type of discrimination. The issues instead include a lack of information on how to replace documents, lack of financial resources to do so, and lack of supporting documentation to start the process. Some respondents also point explicitly to the refusal of authorities to conduct the necessary bureaucratic procedures for documentation replacement. Of the 14% of returnees in this sample who did report missing personal documentation at some point since 2014, nearly all have been able to obtain new documents

It should be noted that these issues do not tend to be generalized in any case across the returnee population. Rather, issues with documentation are instead seem confined to specific groups of people, which explains the low rates here. **However, the impact of not having documentation, and the complexity involved in addressing the issue, make the right to personal documentation one of the most important to attend to.** Continuous interventions and engagement on these issues for specific vulnerable groups is especially warranted, particularly as camps close. People in camps or informal settlements are more likely to have the greater share of documentation issues,

⁴³ Alexandra Saieh, *Barriers from Birth: Undocumented Children in Iraq Sentenced to a Life on the Margins* (Erbil: NRC, 2019).

⁴⁴ Paula Garcia, *Ignoring Iraq's Most Vulnerable: The Plight of the Displaced* (Erbil: CIVIC, 2021).

preventing them from being able to return or seek other solutions to displacement.⁴⁵


Notably, in Sinjar district a significantly higher proportion of households are than the average. This is frequently explained by a legacy of legal discrimination toward

the Yazidi population stemming from the former regime. For example, the district does not have relevant administrative authorities or offices to obtain documentation easily.⁴⁶

DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 5

The following figures provide the district break-down for the indicator used to measure rights to personal documentation.

% of returnee households with a member still missing key family or personal identification documentation



45 Elysia Buchanan and Caroline Zullo, Life in the Margins: Re-Examining the Needs of Paperless People in Post-Conflict Iraq (Erbil: DRC, NRC, IRC, BWA, JC, KOHRW, and HAI, 2022).

46 Ina Rehema Jahn et al., Housing, Land and Property Issues.

CRITERIA 6: RIGHT TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Right-to-family reunification deals with cases where family members are separated by force and prevented from reuniting in their place of origin.

Key takeaway: There is no prevalence of cases where returnee households are forcibly separated with some members blocked from returning—this indicator, however, may underreport cases of close relatives that are missing or disappeared.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

This right refers to ensuring that returnees who wish to reunite with family members from whom they were separated because of displacement have been able to do so and seek a durable solution together.⁴⁷ This should occur as quickly as possible, particularly when children, older persons, or other vulnerable persons are involved. Further aspects pertain to undertaking tracing efforts to establish the fate and whereabouts of missing relatives, and informing the next of kin on progress and results of the investigation. In cases when find missing relatives, it is necessary to establish special legal procedures to provide the next of kin with accelerated access to pensions, property, and/or care arrangements as relevant.⁴⁸

The data here focuses on returnees reuniting (should they wish to) with the family members they were separated from due to displacement. In the context of return, family separations may take on many forms. The process of return may involve some household members opting to go back to their place of origin, while other members remain in displacement; but when this separation is not by choice, as in the instances explained next, it means that households may seek to attain their right to reunification. In some

cases, especially after conflict, family members may be missing or disappeared. In others, there may be a legal basis, either formal or customary, that impedes family reunification. For example, in Iraq, this could be cases when individuals lack security clearance, are imprisoned, or are blocked from returning by authorities, security forces or tribes. For blocked returns, usually linked to perceived ISIL affiliation their returns may pose risks not only to themselves but their family members who have already returned (in some cases because they disavowed these relatives to be able to come back). There is thus sometimes a blurred line with respect to this issue.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

To evaluate these criteria, only the direct attainment of the right to family reunification is considered with regard to bringing separated family members together in return.

Less than 1% of households reported a member currently missing by forced or prevented from returnee in 2022. Thus, only a handful of households report having a close relative currently separated by force or prevented from return. Most of these cases are concentrated in Heet district. The reason most often indicated by households is that they are blocked from returning by authorities, security forces, or tribes.

47 IASC, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions, 40.

48 Ibid., 41.


It should be noted that this specific indicator used in the survey may underreport other cases of forced family separation that deal specifically with close relatives who

are missing or disappeared during conflict or in the post-conflict period.⁴⁹

DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 6

The following figures provide the district break-down for the indicator used to measure right to family reunification.

% of returnee households with a member currently separated by force or prevented from return



49 To put this claim in context, other questions in the survey reveal that 17% of the households had a member kidnapped, disappeared, or imprisoned at some point during the ISIL conflict. However, there was no follow-up regarding their current situation.

CRITERIA 7: RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Another component of reintegration is that returnees should be able to exercise the right to engage and have a meaningful role in public affairs in their places of origin on equal footing.

Key takeaway: Returnees generally feel able to participate in social and civic activities without discrimination. Respondents reported being able to register to vote should they choose to. However, *one in three households* felt that they are not able to express critical views without retributive violence against them. Moreover, most feel that participation is not meaningful because it does not bring change.

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

There are different avenues to participate and contribute to community affairs, such as taking part in common activities, associating and interacting with other members, or having a say in the direction the community is heading, in deciding what should be done to best improve life there for residents. These are core elements that help foster social cohesion among people and between people and the state.

As such, returnees must be able to engage in any of these options of public participation without discrimination or negative repercussions against them. The issue is not if people participate or not (because they have the right not to do so) but if they are prevented from doing so because of who they are.

However, the characterization of this right continues beyond identifying instances of discrimination alone. A crucial piece is that public participation is meaningful. It should bring a sense of agency and decision-making within the community that extends from the local to

national level. This is usually achieved when people feel that change is eventually possible or, at least, that there is a sense of solidarity and that one's voice is heard.⁵⁰ Public participation and community mobilization are integral to creating a more just and equitable society, especially in areas that were affected by conflict.

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS MEASURED?

The indicators below encompass various forms of public participation⁵¹, such as: volunteering in the community, donating to charity, initiating a neighbourhood project, having a say in public or political affairs, expressing grievances or demands, contacting a community leader to express a view, and participating in national democratic processes. Regarding the latter, national parliamentary elections were held in the country in 2021 before data collection for this study.

50 Nadia Siddiqui and Khogir W. Mohammed, *Movements before Mechanisms: Community Grievances and Windows of Opportunity for Restorative Justice in a Transitional Justice Context Summary Findings* (Erbil: Social Inquiry, 2022).

51 These are drawn from standard surveys of public engagement used in Iraq previously and adapted to a post-conflict durable solutions context, including the Iraq Knowledge Network Survey (2011), Database by Central Statistical Office, Government of Iraq, and USIP, Sanad for Peacebuilding, and Social Inquiry, Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework (2020), and Iraq's Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework (2021).

For these three indicators, there is no 2012 benchmark available given the changes in phrasing of responses to capture displacement related barriers.


Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who feel discriminated against or prevented from participating in civic activities	1%	
% of returnees who feel discriminated against or prevented from participating in public/political affairs	2%	
% of returnees who experienced barriers when exercising the right to vote in 2021 elections	7%	
Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who avoid participating in public affairs because they have no hope for change	25%	
% of returnees who feel unable to express critical views without violence against them	30%	
% of returnees who feel electoral processes do not translate needs/expectations into outcomes	84%	

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

The level of engagement of individuals in the community is particularly varied (Figure 6). While there are high rates of participation in volunteering or in neighbourhood initiatives, participating in more political or public affairs is much less common (left part of the Figure 6). A large proportion of individuals indicate not even being interested in participating.

Based on these results, feelings of discrimination in public participation are minimal and frequently confined to specific districts, such as Hawija, Balad, and Khanaqin. These areas feature an above-average rate of returnees feeling that they are discriminated or prevented in participating in social activities.

Figure 6. Participation in social and civil activities



Most returnees did not express any voting issue, except those in Hawija. Obtaining a personal biometric card and inaccessible polling stations in the district are the principal challenges to not voting.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

When expanding the analysis to include how returnees feel about participation, results are more mixed. As seen above in Figure 6 shows a part of the population who refuses to engage in public affairs or in civic activities because they do not consider it worthwhile, as they feel that community participation has no impact. In addition to this, some feel that critical views cannot be freely voiced in their communities. The concerns in raising their voices reflect the current security situation, and previous violence during public protests immediately before the ISIL conflict⁵², and most recently, in Baghdad and the southern governorates.⁵³

Other means of expressing one’s voice, such as participating in electoral processes, are met with even more negative attitudes. Most respondents tend to feel elections are ineffective in bringing change (Table 4). This pessimism against political elections is pervasive across all districts of return—and is likely one reason behind particularly low voter turnout in the 2021 elections⁵⁴.

The vast majority of people could vote without discrimination, but decided not to do so.

Table 4. Level of confidence in electoral processes in returned area

How confident are you that Iraqi elections can help translate people’s expectations into positive change?	Percentage of respondents
Completely	2%
A lot	9%
A little	22%
Not at all	63%
[Not concerned / not interested / indifferent]	5%

52 Liz Sly, “Arab Spring-Style Protests Take Hold in Iraq,” Washington Post, 8 February 2013.

53 Louisa Loveluck and Emilienne Malfatto, “Roar of Hope. Silence of Despair,” Washington Post, 21 April 2021.

54 Al Jazeera, “Vote Count Underway in Iraq After Record Low Turnout,” Al Jazeera, 11 October 2021.


Increasing participation in elections is essential for engendering hope and establishing a more conducive environment for sustainable reintegration. This requires more responsive institutions on one side and a re-engagement of citizens themselves as critical agents for change to advocate for this responsiveness on the

other, incorporating community groups like youth and women that tend to be left out of civil society. Such efforts are critical now as individuals retreat from the civic space given, their limited impact they feel they have had thus far.


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 7

The following figures provide the district breakdown for the indicators used to measure rights to participation in public affairs.


% of returnees who feel discriminated against or prevented from participating in civic activities




% of returnees who feel discriminated against or prevented from participating in public/political affairs




% of returnees who experienced barriers when exercising right to vote in 2021 elections




% of returnees who avoid participating in public affairs because they have no hope for change



% of returnees feeling unable to express critical views without violence against them



% of returnees who feel electoral processes do not translate needs/expectations into outcomes



CRITERIA 8: RIGHT TO LEGAL REMEDIES AND JUSTICE

The final component of reintegration pertains to the ability of returnees to access justice for displacement- and conflict-related violations that should seek to meet immediate needs and serve to prevent such violations from happening again.

Key takeaways: This area is where the gaps are significant, and much work remains to be done. A large majority of returnees report a failure to see their grievances and violations addressed. They also report inadequate implementation of justice and the rule of law more broadly. Some of these conditions are also reportedly considerably worse now than before the conflict.

LEGAL REMEDIES AND JUSTICE: DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS VS. SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS

Justice and redress for abuses and violations suffered during displacement and conflict can take many forms, from criminal accountability to truth-seeking to reparations and compensation to institutional reforms. Community-based processes can also take place aiming to achieve reconciliation by addressing local sources of conflict or long-held grievances. A crucial part of this is that they need to be participatory and reflect the needs of all groups. Thus, remedies and justice may be administered individually or collectively, but critically need to recognize the dignity of all victims as citizens and offer a potential means to come to terms with an entrenched and unjust past (or present).

Legal remedies and justice should seek understand, recognize, and address the root causes of these violations in the first place, including through the implementation of justice and equitable rule of law for society writ large and transparent and functioning institutions that serve the public good.

HOW ARE RIGHTS TO LEGAL REMEDIES AND JUSTICE MEASURED?

The indicators below encompass both the remedies for immediate justice and longer-term concerns pertaining to the rule of law, corruption, impunity, and acknowledgment.


Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnee households who have not accessed or experienced remedies for conflict-related violations	56%	
% of returnees who do not feel adequately represented in local reconciliation efforts	66%	
Sustainable fulfillment of rights as residents in long term	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who indicate that the legal system is ineffective	45%	45%
% of returnees who feel corruption is more extended now than two years ago	87%	65%
% of returnees who indicate there is impunity for crimes committed by security forces or public officials	59%	
% of returnees who do not feel acknowledged by the state for the grievances experienced	69%	

WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE DIRECT ATTAINMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Most returnees have not been able to access nor receive legal remedies for violations during the ISIL conflict. The violations they seek remedy for primarily pertain

to house destruction (either by ISIL or from military operations) and in a smaller proportion, the death of family members. By and large, people seek individual compensation, likely as that is the mechanism with which they are most familiar via Law 20,⁵⁵ followed by criminal accountability, and reforms (Figure 7).

Figure 7. preferred remedies for violations experienced in the conflict among returnees in districts of return



An even higher proportion of returnees feel their views are not represented in local reconciliation processes. These processes, including local peace agreements negotiated and signed by tribal leaders and other stakeholders, including government officials and security actors in areas of return, have sought to help facilitate peaceful returns and address some conflict-related grievances in communities. While these agreements do seem to foster safe returns regardless of whether the community (or those still displaced) participated in their negotiation, the sustainability of this return, reintegration may depend on greater participation of women, youth, civil society, and the displaced to balance all parties' needs.⁵⁶

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE FULFILMENT OF RIGHTS IN IRAQ?

Prospects for longer-term remedies and justice seem farther from reach for many returnees. The same proportion of returnees now as 2012 populations in these districts of return—nearly half—feel the legal system is ineffective. Returnees indicate this is predominantly due to corruption, the same reason many also stated for their inability to access the remedies above.

55 Iraq adopted the Yezidi Female Survivor's Law (No. 8/2021) that lays out a framework for individual compensation and collective and symbolic reparations for specific Yezidi, Christian, Shabak and Turkmen survivors of ISIL perpetration. In September 2021, the Parliament adopted bylaws for the implementation of the law and the Directorate-General for Survivors Affairs is reportedly seeking resources to launch the applications process for individual survivors to benefit from the provisions in the law.

56 Jacqueline Parry and Olga Aymerich, "Local Peace Agreements and the Return of IDPs with Perceived ISIL Affiliation in Iraq," Policy Research Working Paper 9961 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice, 2022).


Further underscoring the concern over corruption is that an overwhelming majority of returnees feel it is worse now than two years ago. This proportion is considerably higher than those who reported the same in the years prior to the ISIL conflict. Linked to this is a substantial view of pervasive impunity of those in power across districts. These two grievances were contributing drivers of the civilian protests that swept through many

of the districts under study here in 2012 and 2013, were grievances from which ISIL initially gained ground.⁵⁷ That they still exist and have potentially worsened, coupled with a significant majority of returnees not feeling acknowledged in their grievances at present, indicate that root causes of fragility, violence, and conflict have yet to be adequately remedied.


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR CRITERIA 8

The following figures provide the district breakdown for the indicators used to measure rights to legal remedies and justice.

% of returnee households who have not accessed or experienced remedies for conflict-related violations




% of returnees who do not feel adequately represented in local reconciliation efforts




57 Sly, "Arab Spring-Style Protests Take Hold in Iraq."


% of returnees who indicate that the legal system is ineffective



% of returnees who indicate there is impunity for crimes committed by security forces or public officials



% of returnees who do not feel acknowledged by the state for grievances they experienced



REINTEGRATION AS A MESURABLE OUTCOME

All the criteria presented in the previous sections are part of a normative durable solutions framework that defines when a household's displacement situation is resolved. This is complemented below with a more standalone evaluation of the state of a household's reintegration through subjective responses and attitudes expressed by returnees about being back in their places of origin.

REINTEGRATION: A DURABLE RESOLUTION OF DISPLACEMENT FOR RETURNEES IN IRAQ

Multiple analytical obstacles limit the scope for making a definitive conclusion regarding the reintegration of displaced families. The criteria framework used in this report mainly consists of a normative assumption that, when households meet all or most of the criteria in their places of origin, they are reintegrated. This assumption may be more realistic when differentiating between a direct attainment of rights and their sustainable fulfilment. Even then, each criteria has multiple indicators and there is no one single way to measure them. A complementary approach to assessing the resolution of displacement can consist of measuring more subjective and behavioural attitudes expressed by returnees about being back in their place of origin.

Rates of re-displacement, or intentions to re-displace, from areas of return are a more standard way to measure successful reintegration. Past measurements of these in Iraq showed that less than 3% of returnee

households planned to leave or actually did, regardless of how bad living conditions were in return.⁵⁸ Furthermore, qualitative findings indicate that, even if people do not plan to leave, they do express feelings of alienation upon return.⁵⁹ This indicates that reintegration is not a linear process but rather a complex effort toward claiming socio-political rights as well as material needs.⁶⁰

Thus, some initial options to better measure this can be tested, for example, through other proxy indicators. In the absence of a full sense reintegration, returnees may feel they likely have to migrate or displace again. They may also feel unable to resume their lives on their own terms and prosper, and/or that they are overall marginalized overall, in some sense going back to square one before the conflict or feeling considerably worse off now than prior to the conflict. This survey aimed to capture these types of subjective outcomes across different parts of the questionnaire.

58 IOM and Social Inquiry, Home Again?

59 See, for example, Nadia Siddiqui, "‘Like a Father Who Doesn't Love his Children': Institutional Trust, State Neglect, and Prospects for Justice in Post-Conflict Iraq," Research Brief (Erbil: Social Inquiry, 2021).

60 Bradley, "Durable Solutions and the Right of Return for IDPs."

HOW IS SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION AS AN OUTCOME MEASURED?

The following three indicators attempt to capture subjective and behavioural attitudes expressed by returnees as a proxy for their overarching reintegration state.

Direct attainment of rights upon return	Districts of return 2022	Districts of return 2012
% of returnees who feel they (or any HH member) will have no option but migrate/displace again	10%	
% of returnees who feel unable to advance/prosper in the location over time	57%	
% of returnees who feel marginalized or neglected as citizens	65%	

WHAT IS THE OVERALL SITUATION IN TERMS OF SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION IN IRAQ?

The most direct indicator of whether returns may be durable, the likelihood of needing to displace or migrate again, shows a moderately positive result. Only 10% of returnees seem convinced that they will have to leave their place of origin again due to dire situations but, as Table 5 indicates, another 5% are considering this. In addition, nearly one in four of returnee households are still unsure whether they should attempt to resume life elsewhere (24%). The majority are certain they will stay. This is in line with related research that shows that people would not undertake the action of displacing again unless being forced by similar conflict events or extremely dire situations.⁶¹

Table 5. Perceptions towards remaining or moving out in districts of return

What is the likelihood that you will have no option but to migrate or move again in the foreseeable future because of conditions here?	Percentage of respondents
Yes, for sure	1%
Very likely	9%
We are considering leaving	5%
Not sure	24%
Not likely at all	62%
Total	100%

Some districts show a higher percentage of returnees expressing intentions to re-displace. In Hawija, nearly half of returnees indicated it is certain or very likely they will have to leave the relocation area. In Telafar, Kirkuk, and Shirqat respondents also claimed they would have to migrate again (24%, 29%, and 35%, respectively). This indicator represents the reported likelihood of relocation and may not necessarily translate into actual movement.


Even when most people prefer to remain in their areas of return, other concerning indicators appear. **Given current conditions in their locations, more than half of returnees feel that they cannot prosper or obtain a better life over time. Returnees also express high levels of marginalization and neglect as residents at a similar rate.** Lack of prosperity and high marginalization are two aspects that appear when individuals cannot access fundamental rights in the short- and long-run. There is much room for improvement in this latter regard, as seen throughout this report. Addressing these more structural shortfalls across criteria may contribute to increasing optimism about life prospects in return and reducing marginalization over time, thus helping create a bulwark against the likelihood of future displacement, to say nothing of conflict.

61 Nadia Siddiqui, Streets Tell Stories: The Effects of Neighborhood Social Environment on Mental Health and Psychosocial Wellbeing in the Aftermath of Conflict (The Hague: Cordaid, 2021); and IOM, RWG, and Social Inquiry, "Re-Displaced: An Exploration of Displacement after Attempted Return in Iraq," Return Index Thematic Series Briefing 3 (Baghdad: IOM, 2020).


DISTRICT BY DISTRICT: SUMMARY TABLES FOR REINTEGRATION AS AN OUTCOME

The following figures provide the district breakdown for the indicators used to measure reintegration as a subjective outcome.


% of returnees who feel they (or any HH member) will have no option but migrate/displace again



% of returnees who feel unable to advance/prosper in the location over time



% of returnees who feel marginalized or neglected as citizens



CONCLUSION AND KEY TAKEAWAYS

This report examined the prevalence of critical obstacles to reintegration that returnee households face in Iraq as of 2022. These obstacles were grouped into the eight rights-based criteria used to evaluate the achievement of durable solutions, adapted here to cover the attainment of rights upon return and the sustainable fulfilment of these rights over time.

Overall, this report indicates that returnees can attain and exercise their fundamental rights without discrimination (e.g., in accessing services and employment, seeking compensation, and participating in the community). Significant structural issues limit the capacity for full and sustainable enjoyment of these same rights. These issues are mired in neglect, poverty, inequality, and lack of representation and protection, with some of these concerns rooted in communities since before the conflict. Leaving these unaddressed affects the ability of returnees to durably reintegrate in the longer-term and has the potential to increase the risk of future upheaval and displacement.

This report presents a general overview of the attainment and fulfilment of rights upon return. However, these criteria results differ across the 14 districts analysed based on the local dynamics. Some trends in the data highlight that specific communities seem farther away

from facilitating a durable reintegration than others. In particular, **Hawija**, **Sinjar**, and **Shirqat** frequently appear significantly worse than the average across all districts. Sinjar is one of the most underdeveloped districts in Iraq and suffers from some of the most severe ISIL violence. Hawija and Shirqat were subjected to ISIL control for extended periods and were among the last to be retaken by Iraqi Security Forces.⁶²

Finally, the indicators used here to evaluate reintegration as a whole highlight that there are risks that returnee households are left with no other option but re-displace again or further migrate. In addition, as far as subjective feelings of prosperity not being possible and pervasive marginalization remain high, it is difficult to conclude that reintegration is successful. These are symptoms that the sustainable fulfilment of rights that address root causes of conflict and displacement are key components of resolving (and preventing future) displacement.

62 See, for example, "In Iraq's Sinjar, Yazidi Returns Crawl to a Halt Amid Fears of Turkish Airstrikes," New Humanitarian, 10 February 2022.

IOM IRAQ

 iraq.iom.int
 iomiraq@iom.int

UNAMI Compound (Diwan 2),
International Zone,
Baghdad/Iraq

   
@IOMIraq



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