SUDAN PROGRAM
A look at the density of violent incidents in the Sudan conflict
April 2024 marked a milestone of one year in the latest iteration of conflict in Sudan, one of the most critical displacement and protection of civilian crises globally. The analysis of conflict trends available shows its magnitude—and so far, it is immense:
The range of the conflict is seen in the fact that 60% of the violent incidents reported took place in Khartoum but the rest are spread across almost all states. Last month, North Darfur and Jazeera have concentrated the most reported incidents—and El Fasher is currently a priority concern as a key hotspot of violence, putting hundreds of thousands of civilians at risk.
The death toll in Khartoum is estimated at 6,500 deaths thus far, followed by 5,100 in the Darfurs. 2024 has been less deadly than 2023, but there are still around 800 fatalities recorded per month.
Of the total deaths, 86% are linked to attacks and armed clashes, 7% by air and drone strikes, 6% by heavy shelling. Incidents linked to sexual violence are also reported in hundreds.
Only 53% of the incidents recorded have involved SAF against RSF (or vice versa). Another 25% have been between RSF/SAF and civilians (with a heavy impact on civilian lives), and the rest correspond to a combination of SAF/RSF against other armed actors.
While this conflict is frequently portrayed as one between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for the control of the national government and country, this data shows that we should definitely expand this view, both in terms of understanding underlying conflicts within the main one and the more localized role that other armed groups have. This includes rebel groups and armed tribal actors especially in Darfur, Kordofan, and Abyei—sometimes spilling cross-border.
This is critical if a discussion on durable solutions to displacement restarts. There is a history and legacy in this violence even when frontlines, involvement of actors, and conflict hotspots continue to change—and it all affects displacement dynamics. No prospective scenario suggests an improvement of dynamics in either the Darfur or Kordofan regions given the unresolved root causes of past conflicts and the constellation of armed factions present there, which may also trigger more cross-border movements to Chad and South Sudan. In addition, with the conflict gradually advancing eastwards, Sudan’s eastern states offer less of a buffer for conflict-affected people and may push more of them to seek refuge across borders eventually. All while Khartoum continues to be heavily disputed a year after the start of the conflict, making population return movements (already happening indeed) quite unsafe with civilians residing in a blackout environment.
